

L'argument de la productivité pour justifier d'investir dans les jeunes enfants

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Cette conférence est en partie basée sur

Inégalité en Amérique

*Quel est le rôle des politiques sur le
capital humain?*

James J. Heckman

et

Alan B. Krueger

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Figure 1

Schooling Participation Rates by Year of Birth: Data from CPS 2000

A. Whites




Figure 2

A. College Participation Rates by Year of Birth Data from CPS 2000






Figure 3

Educational Statistics by Category Over Time


A. Share of High School Dropouts in the United States, 1971-1999



C. High School Graduates of Regular Day School Programs, Public and Private as a Percent of 17 Years Old Population USA, 1971-1999




Source: U.S. Based on data from (1) The Department of Education National Center for Education Statistics and (2) American Council on Education, General Educational Development Testing Service.



Relative Supply of College-Educated Workers by Cohort

Figure 4


College Participation, 18 to 24 Yrs, HS Grads and GED Holders Dependent* White Males



Source: These numbers were computed from the CPS P-20 School Reports and the October CPS.

*Dependent is living at parental home or supported by parental family while at college.

Figure 5
College Participation by Race
Dependent High School Graduates and GED Holders
Males, Ages 18-24




Note: Three-year moving averages are shown

— White - - - Black ····· Hispanic

Source: These numbers were computed from the CPS P-20 School Reports and the October CPS.

*Dependent is living at parental home or supported by parental family while at college.

Figure 6-1
Rates of Return to Human Capital Investment Initially
Setting Investment to be Equal Across all Ages



Rates of Return to Human Capital Investment Initially Setting Investment to be Equal Across all Ages

Figure 6-2
Optimal Investment Levels





Figure 7-1


Enrollment, Completion and No Delay Rates by Family Income Quartiles and Age-Adjusted AFQT Terciles

White Males, NLSY79


A. Percentage Enrolled in 2-Year and 4-Year Colleges




B. Adjusted Percentage Enrolled in 2-Year and 4-Year Colleges




C. 4-Year College Completion Rate



D. Adjusted 4-Year College Completion Rate



E. Percentage with No Delay in College Entry



F. Adjusted Percentage with No Delay in College Entry




Table 2A

Adjusted Gaps in College Participation: Percentage of Population Credit Constrained

	White		Black		Hispanic		Overall
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	
Enrollment	0.0515	0.0449	-0.0047	0.0543	0.0433	-0.0789	0.0419
Complete 4-Year College	-0.0621	0.0579	-0.0612	-0.0106	0.0910	0.0908	-0.0438
Complete 2-Year College	0.0901	0.0436	-0.0684	-0.0514	0.2285	0.0680	0.0774
Proportion of People Not Delaying College Entry	0.0872	-0.0197	-0.1125	-0.1128	0.1253	-0.0053	0.0594
Enrollment in 4-Year vs. 2-Year College	0.0646	0.0491	0.1088	0.0024	0.1229	-0.0915	0.0587

Table 2B

Adjusted Gaps in College Participation

Percentage of Population Credit Constrained: Only Statistically Significant Gaps

	White		Black		Hispanic		Overall
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	
Enrollment	0	0.0095	0	0.0164	0.0278	-0.0139	0.0018
Complete 4-Year College	-0.0545	0.0089	-0.0596	0	0	0	0.0461
Complete 2-Year College	0	0	0	0	0	0.0409	0.0020
Proportion of People Not Delaying College Entry	0.0714	-0.0318	-0.0190	0.0459	0.0487	0	0.0538
Enrollment in 4-Year vs. 2-Year College	0.0530	0	0	0	0	-0.0451	0.0391

Table 2C

Adjusted Gaps in College Participation: Percentage of Population Family Constrained

	White		Black		Hispanic		Overall
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	
Enrollment	0.3123	0.3280	0.2658	0.2420	0.3210	0.2923	0.2623
Complete 4-Year College	0.2723	0.2338	0.1435	0.0738	0.4950	0.0205	0.1958
Complete 2-Year College	-0.1718	-0.0350	-0.0763	-0.0565	-0.1945	0.2168	-0.0785
Proportion of People Not Delaying College Entry	0.1965	0.1898	0.1910	0.0460	0.1950	0.1360	0.1135
Enrollment in 4-Year vs. 2-Year College	0.0568	0.2423	0.1643	0.1143	0.1533	0.0738	0.1155

Table 2D

Adjusted Gaps in College Participation

Percentage of Population Family Constrained: Only Statistically Significant Gaps

	White		Black		Hispanic		Overall
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	
Enrollment	0.3123	0.3280	0.2378	0.2420	0.3210	0.2923	0.2623
Complete 4-Year College	0.2723	0.2338	0.0960	0	0.4950	0	0.1958
Complete 2-Year College	-0.1408	0	0	0	0	0.1678	-0.0730
Proportion of People Not Delaying College Entry	0.1718	0.1328	0.1403	0	0.1560	0	0.1135
Enrollment in 4-Year vs. 2-Year College	0.0333	0.2423	0.1350	0.0848	0.1225	0	0.1155

Table 3


Regression of Enrollment in College on Per Capita Permanent Income, Per Capita Early Income, and Per Capita Late Income: Children of the NLSY

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Family Income 0-18 (permanent income)	0.0839	0.0747	0.0902	0.0779
(Standard error)	(0.0121)	(0.0184)	(0.0185)	(0.0284)
Family Income 0-5 (Standard error)	--	0.0158 (0.0238)	--	0.0149 (0.0261)
Family Income 16-18 (Standard error)	--	--	-0.0069 (0.0177)	-0.0023 (0.0194)
PIAT-Math at Age 12 (Standard error)	0.0077 (0.0017)	0.0076 (0.0018)	0.0076 (0.0018)	0.0075 (0.0018)
Constant (Standard error)	0.1447 (0.0264)	0.1404 (0.0272)	0.1410 (0.0268)	0.1380 (0.0273)
Observations	863	863	861	861
R ²	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.11

Figure 9

Children of NLSY


(a) Average percentile rank on PIAT-Math score, by income quartile*



*Income quartiles are computed from average family income between the ages of 6 and 10.

◆ Lowest income quartile ■ Second income quartile ▲ Third income quartile ✕ Highest income quartile

Figure 9 (continued)
 (b) Average percentile rank on PIAT-Math score, by income quartile*
 Whites only



*Income quartiles are computed from average family income between the ages of 6 and 10.

Figure 9 (continued)

(c) Average percentile rank on PIAT-Math score, by race





Figure 10

Children of NLSY

(a) Residualized average PIAT-Math score percentiles by income quartile*




*Residualized on maternal education, maternal AFQT (corrected for the effect of schooling) and broken home at each age.

◆ Lowest income quartile ■ Second income quartile ▲ Third income quartile × Highest income quartile

Figure 10 (continued)

(b) Residualized average PIAT-Math score percentiles by income quartile*
Whites only




*Residualized on maternal education, maternal AFQT (corrected for the effect of schooling) and broken home at each age.

◆ Lowest income quartile ■ Second income quartile ▲ Third income quartile ✕ Highest income quartile

Figure 10 (continued)

(c) Residualized average PIAT-Math score percentile by race*




*Residualized on maternal education, maternal AFQT (corrected for the effect of schooling) and broken home at each age and family income at each age.

Hispanic Black White

Figure 11

Children of NLSY

(a) Average percentile rank on anti-social score, by income quartile*




*Income quartiles are computed from average family income between the ages of 6 and 10.

●—● Lowest income quartile ■—■ Second income quartile ▲—▲ Third income quartile ×—× Highest income quartile

Figure 11(continued)

(b) Average percentile rank on anti-social score, by income quartile*

Whites only



*Income quartiles are computed from average family income between the ages of 6 and 10.

●—● Lowest income quartile ■—■ Second income quartile ▲—▲ Third income quartile ×—× Highest income quartile

Figure 11(continued)
(c) Average percentile rank on anti-social score, by race





Figure 12

Children of NLSY

(a) Residualized average anti-social score percentile by income quartile*




*Residualized on maternal education, maternal AFQT (corrected for the effect of schooling), broken home at each age.

● Lowest income quartile ■ Second income quartile ▲ Third income quartile × Highest income quartile

Figure 12 (continued)

(b) Residualized average anti-social score percentile by income quartile*

Whites only




*Residualized on maternal education, maternal AFQT (corrected for the effect of schooling), broken home at each age.



Figure 12 (continued)

(c) Residualized average anti-social score percentile by race*




*Residualized on maternal education, maternal AFQT (corrected for the effect of schooling), family income at each age and broken home at each age.

Hispanic Black White

Figure 13
Density of age adjusted AFQT scores,
GED recipients and high school graduates with twelve years of schooling

(a) White males



(b) White females





Figure 13 (continued)

(c) Black males



(d) Black females






Figure 13 (continued)

(e) Hispanic males



(f) Hispanic females




Source: Heckman, Hsee and Rubinstein (2001).

Table 4
 Return to one year of college for individuals
 at different percentiles of the math test score distribution
 White males from High School and Beyond

	5%	25%	50%	75%	95%
Average return in the population	0.1121 (0.0400)	0.1374 (0.0328)	0.1606 (0.0357)	0.1831 (0.0458)	0.2101 (0.0622)
Return for those who attend college	0.1640 (0.0503)	0.1893 (0.0582)	0.2125 (0.0676)	0.2350 (0.0801)	0.2621 (0.0962)
Return for those who do not attend college	0.0702 (0.0536)	0.0954 (0.0385)	0.1187 (0.0298)	0.1411 (0.0305)	0.1682 (0.0425)
Return for those at the margin	0.1203 (0.0364)	0.1456 (0.0300)	0.1689 (0.0345)	0.1913 (0.0453)	0.2184 (0.0631)


Figure 14
Distribution of returns to college versus high school
NLSY79



Source: Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2003).

Figure 16

Average marginal returns for those at the margin of indifference between college and high school



Notes: Average marginal return is computed for persons at the margin of attending college for a given level of index. Factors promoting schooling refer to variables related to schooling (higher level of index leads to a higher probability of attending college).

The density in the figure corresponds to the density of individuals at each level of the index.

Source: Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003).

Table 5

Evaluating School Quality Policies: Discounted Net Returns to Decreasing Pupil-Teacher Ratio by 5 for People with 12 Years of Schooling in 1990

	Productivity Growth Rate	Includes 50% Social Cost of Funds	Annual Rate of Return to Earnings from School Quality Change		
			1%	2%	4%
7% Discount Rate					
	0%	Yes	-9056	-8092	-6163
	0%	No	-5716	-4752	-2823
	1%	Yes	-8878	-7736	-5451
	1%	No	-5538	-4396	-2111
5% Discount Rate					
	0%	Yes	-9255	-7537	-4103
	0%	No	-5597	-3880	-445
	1%	Yes	-8887	-6802	-2632
	1%	No	-5230	-3145	1025
3% Discount Rate					
	0%	Yes	-8840	-5591	905
	0%	No	-4810	-1562	4934
	1%	Yes	-8036	-3984	4119
	1%	No	-4007	45	8149

Table 6
Effects of Early Intervention Programs

Program/Study	Costs ^a	Program description	Test scores	Schooling	Pre-delinquency crime
Abecedarian Project ^b (Ramey et al (1988))	N/A	Full-time year-round classes for children from infancy through preschool	Higher scores at ages 1-4	34% less in-grade retention by second grade; better reading and math proficiency	
Early Training ^b (Gray, Ramey and Klaus(1982))	N/A	Part-time classes for children in summer; weekly home visits during school year	Higher scores at ages 5-10	16% less in-grade retention; 21% higher high school graduation	
Harlem Study (Palmer (1983))	N/A	Individual teacher-child sessions twice-weekly for young males	Higher scores at ages 3-5	21% less in-grade retention	
Houston PCDC ^b (Johnson (1988))	N/A	Home visits for parents for two yrs; child nursery care four days per week in year 2 (Mexican Americans)	Higher scores at age 3		Rated less aggressive and hostile by mothers (ages 8-11)
Milwaukee Project ^b (Garber (1988))	N/A	Full-time year-round classes for children through first grade; job training for mothers	Higher scores at ages 2-10	27% less in-grade retention	

Table 6 (continued)

Program/Study	Costs ^a	Program description	Test scores	Schooling	Pre-Delinquency Crime
Mother-Child Home Program (Levenstein, O'Hara, and Madden (1983))	N/A	Home visits with mothers and children twice weekly	Higher scores at ages 3-4	6% less in-grade retention	N/A
Perry Preschool Program ^b (Schweinhart, Barnes, and Weikart (1993))	\$13,400	Weekly home visits with parents; intensive, high-quality preschool services for one to two years	Higher scores in all studied years (ages 5-27)	21% less in-grade retention or special services; 21% higher HS graduation rates	2.3 versus 4.6 lifetime arrests by age 27 7% versus 35% arrested 5 or more times
Rome Head Start (Monroe and McDonald (1981))	\$5,400 (2 years)	Part-time classes for children; parent involvement		12% less in-grade retention; 17% higher HS graduation rates	
Syracuse University Family Development (Lally, Mangione, and Honig (1988))	\$38,100	Weekly home visits for family; day care year round	Higher scores at ages 3-4		6% versus 22% had probation files; offenses were less severe
Yale experiment	\$23,300	Family support; home visits and day care as needed for thirty months	Better language development at thirty months	Better school Attendance and adjustment; fewer special adjustments; school services (age 12 1/2)	Rated less aggressive and pre delinquent by teachers and parents (ages 12 1/2)

Note: All comparisons are for program participants versus non-participants. ^a Costs valued in 1990 dollars.

^b Studies used a random assignment experimental design to determine program impacts. Data from Donohue and Siegelman (1998), Schweinhart, Barnes, and Weikart (1993), and Seitz (1990) for the impacts reported here. N/A indicates not available.

Source: Heckman, Lochner, Smith, and Taber (1997).

Table 7

Perry Preschool: Net present values of costs and benefits through age 27

1. Cost of preschool for child, ages 3-4	12,148
2. Decrease in cost to government of K-12 special education courses for child, ages 5 to 18	6,365
3. Decrease in direct criminal justice system costs ^a of child's criminal activity, ages 15 to 28	7,378
4. Decrease in direct criminal justice system costs ^a of child's projected criminal activity, ages 29 to 44	2,817
5. Income from child's increased employment, ages 19 to 27	8,380
6. Projected income from child's increased employment, ages 28 to 65	7,565
7. Decrease in tangible losses to crime victims, ages 15 to 44	10,690
<hr/>	
Total benefits:	43,195
Total benefits excluding projections ^b	32,813
<hr/>	
Benefits minus costs	31,047
Benefits minus costs excluding projections ^b	20,665

Sources: Karoly et al (1998) and Barnett (1993).

Notes: All values are net present values in 1996 dollars at age 0 calculated using a 4 percent discount rate.

^aDirect criminal justice system costs are the administrative costs of incarceration.

^bBenefits from projected decreased criminal activity (4) and projected income from increased employment (6) are excluded.

Table 8A
Outcomes of Early Intervention Programs: Cognitive Measures

Program (Years of Operation)	Outcome	Followed up to Age	Age When Treatment Effect Last Statistically Significant	Control Group	Change in Treated
Early Training Project (1962 - 1965)	IQ	16-20	6	82.8	+12.2
Perry Preschool Project (1962-1967)	IQ	27	7	87.1	+4.0
Houston PCDC (1970 - 1980)	IQ	8-11	2	90.8	+8.0
Syracuse FDRP (1969 - 1970)	IQ	15	3	90.6	+19.7
Carolina Abecedarian (1972 - 1985)	IQ	21	12	88.4	+5.3
Project CARE (1978 - 1984)	IQ	4.5	3	92.6	+11.6
IHDP (1985 - 1988)	IQ (HLBW sample)	8	8	92.1	+4.4

Notes: HLBW = heavier, low birth weight sample. Cognitive measures include Stanford-Binet and Weschler Intelligence Scales, California Achievement Tests, and other IQ and achievement tests measuring cognitive ability. All results significant at .05 level or higher.

Source: Karoly, 2001. For a discussion of specific treatments offered under each program see Heckman (2000) and Karoly (2001).

Table 8B
Outcomes of Early Intervention Programs: Educational Outcomes

Program (Years of Operation)	Outcome	Followed up to Age	Age When Treatment Effect Last Statistically Significant	Control Group	Change in Treated
Early Training Project	Special Education	16-20	18	29%	-26%
Perry Preschool Project	Special Education	27	19	28%	-12%
	High School Graduation		27	45%	+21%
Chicago CPC (1967 - present)	Special Education	20	18	25%	-10%
	Grade Retention		15	38%	-15%
	High School Graduation		20	39%	+11%
Carolina Abecedarian	College Enrollment	21	21	14%	+22%

Note: All results significant at .05 level or higher.

Source: Karoly, 2001. For a discussion of specific treatments offered under each program see Heckman (2000) and Karoly (2001).

Table 8C
Outcomes of Early Intervention Programs: Economic Outcomes

Program (Years of Operation)	Outcome	Followed up to Age	Age When Treatment Effect Last Statistically Significant	Control Group	Change in Treated
Perry Preschool Project	Arrest Rate	27	27	69%	-12%
	Employment Rate		27	32%	+18%
	Monthly Earnings		27	\$766	+\$453
	Welfare Use		27	32%	-17%
Chicago CPC (preschool vs. no preschool)	Juvenile Arrests	20	18	25%	-8%
Syracuse FDRP	Probation Referral	15	15	22%	-16%
Elmira PEIP (1978 - 1982)	Arrests (HR sample)	15	15	0.53	-45%

Notes: HR = high risk. All results significant at .05 level or higher.

Source: Karoly, 2001. For a discussion of specific treatments offered under each program see Heckman (2000) and Karoly (2001).

Table 9

Estimated Benefits of Mentoring Programs (Treatment Group Reductions Compared to Control Group)

Program	Outcome Measure	Change	Program Costs per Participant
Big Brother / Big Sister			\$500 - \$1500*
	Initiating drug use	-45.8%	
	Initiation alcohol use	-27.4%	
	# of times hit someone	-31.7%	
	# of times stole something	-19.2%	
	Grade Point Average	3.0%	
	Skipped Class	-36.7%	
	Skipped Day of School	-52.2%	
	Trust in Parent	2.7%	
	Lying to Parent	-36.6%	
Peer Emotional Support	2.3%		
Sponsor - A - Scholar			\$1485
	10th Grade GPA (100 point scale)	2.9	
	11th Grade GPA (100 point scale)	2.5	
	% Attending College (1 year after HS)	32.8%	
	% Attending College (2 years after HS)	28.1%	
Quantum Opportunity Program	Graduated HS or GED	+26%	
	Enrolled in 4-year college	+15%	
	Enrolled in 2-year college	+24%	
	Currently employed full time	+13%	
	Self receiving welfare	-22%	
	% ever arrested	-4%	

Sources: Benefits from Heckman (1999) and Taggart (1995), costs from Johnson (1996) and Herrera et al. (2000).

Notes: *Costs, in 1996 dollars, for school-based programs are as low as \$500 and more expensive community based mentoring programs cost as high as \$1500; HS = high school

Table 10**Effects of selected adolescent social programs on schooling, earnings, and crime**

Program/Study	Costs ^a	Program Description	Schooling	Earnings ^a	Crime ^a
STEP (Walker and Viella-Velez, (1992))	N/A	Two summers of employment, academic remediation and life skills for 14 to 15 year olds	Short-run gains in test scores; no effect on school completion rates	N/A	N/A
Quantum Opportunities Program ^b (Taggart, (1995))	\$10,600	Counseling; educational, community, and development services; financial incentives for four years beginning in ninth grade)	34% higher high graduation and GED reception rates (two years after program)	N/A	4% versus 16% convicted; .28 versus .56 average. number of arrests (2 years after program)

Source: Heckman, Lochner, Smith and Taber (1997).

Notes: All comparisons are for program participants vs. non-participants. N/A indicated not available.

^a All dollar figures are in 1990 values

^b Studies used a random assignment experimental design to determine program impacts.

Table 12
Average Marginal Effect on Participation in Company Training

Variables	Average Marginal Effect					
	White Males		Black Males		Hispanic Males	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Age-Adjusted AFQT	0.0149 (0.0024)	- -	0.0182 (0.0033)	- -	0.0066 (0.0037)	- -
Family Income in 1979 (in \$10,000)	-0.0021 (0.0012)	-0.0005 (0.0011)	-0.0047 (0.0024)	-0.0019 (0.0023)	0.0011 (0.0024)	0.0015 (0.0023)
Grade Completed	0.0382 (0.001)	- -	0.0060 (0.0014)	- -	0.0036 (0.0014)	- -
Father's Education	-0.0014 (0.0006)	0.0007 (0.0005)	0.0003 (0.0008)	0.0010 (0.0008)	0.0002 (0.0007)	0.0008 (0.0007)

Table 12 (cont.)

Variables	White Females		Black Females		Hispanic Females	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Age-Adjusted AFQT	0.0076 (0.0025)	- -	0.0169 (0.0038)	- -	0.0159 (0.0045)	- -
Family Income in 1979 (in \$10,000)	-0.0007 (0.0011)	0.0001 (0.0011)	-0.0006 (0.0024)	0.0014 (0.0023)	-0.0065 (0.0031)	-0.0043 (0.0029)
Grade Completed	0.0027 (0.0010)	- -	0.0014 (0.0016)	- -	0.0013 (0.0016)	- -
Father's Education	0.0001 (0.0006)	0.0009 (0.0006)	0.0015 (0.0008)	0.0021 (0.0008)	-0.00001 (0.0009)	0.0007 (0.0008)

Notes: The panel data set was constructed using NLSY79 data from 1979-1994. Data on training in 1987 is combined with 1988 in the original dataset. Company training consists of formal training run by employer, and military training excluding basic training. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Specification (1) includes a constant, age, father's education, mother's education, number of siblings, southern residence at age 14 dummy, urban residence at age 14 dummy, and year dummies.

Specification (2) drops age-adjusted AFQT and grade completed. Average marginal effect is estimated using average derivatives from a probit regression.

Table 14 Lessons from the Evaluation Literature


Programmes	Appears to help	Appears not to help	General observations on effectiveness
Formal classroom training	Women re-entrants	Prime-age men and older workers with low initial education	<p>Important that courses have strong labour market relevance, or signal “high” quality to employers. Should lead to a qualification that is recognised and valued by employers.</p> <p>Keep programmes relatively small in scale.</p>
On-the-job training	Women re-entrants; single mothers	Prime-age men (?)	<p>Must directly meet labour market needs. Hence, need to establish strong links with local employers, but this increases the risk of displacement.</p>
Job-search assistance (job clubs, individual counselling, etc.)	Most unemployed but in particular, women and sole parents		<p>Must be combined with increased monitoring of the job-search behaviour of the unemployed and enforcement of work tests.</p>
Of which: re-employment bonuses	Most adult unemployed		<p>Requires careful monitoring and controls on both recipients and their former employers.</p>

Table 14 (cont.)
Lessons from the Evaluation Literature

<p>Special youth measures (training, employment subsidies, direct job creation measures)</p>	<p>Disadvantaged youths</p>	<p>Effective programmes need to combine an appropriate and integrated mix of education, occupational skills, work-based learning and supportive services to young people and their families.</p> <p><i>Early and sustained</i> interventions are likely to be most effective.</p> <p>Need to deal with inappropriate attitudes to work on the part of youths. Adult mentors can help.</p>
<p>Subsidies to employment</p>	<p>Long-term unemployed; women re-entrants</p>	<p>Require careful targeting and adequate controls to maximise net employment gains, but there is a trade-off with employer take-up.</p>
<p>Of which: Aid to unemployed starting enterprises</p>	<p>Men (below 40, relatively better educated)</p>	<p>Only works for a small subset of the population.</p>
<p>Direct job creation</p>	<p>Most adult and youth unemployed</p>	<p>Typically provides few long-run benefits and principle of additionality usually implies low marginal-product jobs.</p>


Source: Martin and Grubb, 2001

Figure 17
Trends in Unhealthy Child Environments



Data for births and birth rates are from Ventura and Bachrach (2000). Data for children living with one parent are available at the census bureau at <http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/tabCH-1.txt>. Data for children living in poverty is available at www.childtrendsdatabank.org/

Figure 6-1
 Rates of Return to Human Capital Investment Initially
 Setting Investment to be Equal Across all Ages



Rates of Return to Human Capital Investment Initially Setting Investment to be Equal Across all Ages

L'article et l'annexe peuvent être
téléchargés à cette adresse

<http://jenni.uchicago.edu/Invest/>